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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
John A. Chernak*
Arson: When Is a Trailer a Dwelling House?
-A conviction of arson in the first degree was
reversed and remanded for a new trial by the
Supreme Court of Indiana on the ground that
the state had failed to prove the corpus delicti
independent of the confession of the defendant.
Reasserting the general rule that the corpus
delicti must be shown by some evidence of pro-
bative value aside from the confession, the
court found that the failure of the prosecution
to introduce any evidence to show that the fire
had been ignited pursuant to a criminal design
fell short of satisfying this requirement. Sim-
mons v. State, 129 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1955).
However, the court disagreed on a second point
raised on the appeal. This was that the trial
court had erroneously concluded that the struc-
ture destroyed by the fire, a home-made trailer
set up on blocks with its wheels removed and
occupied continuously as a residence and place
of habitation, was a "dwelling-house" within
the first degree arson statute. IND. An. STAT.
act 1927, c.44, §1 (Burns 1942). Chief Justice
Emmert took the position that since there are
no common law crimes in Indiana the structure
destroyed in the fire had to fall within the
popular meaning of one of the terms employed
in the arson statutes. He then reasoned that
since the statute on motor vehicles regulates
house trailers, since the word "house" has been
popularly defined as being synonymous with
"building" and since the state had failed to
establish that this structure was a building of
any sort, that the logical conclusion was that
the trailer was still a vehicle and therefore
should be regarded as personality falling within
the third degree arson section.
Four justices, a majority on this point, con-
cluded that the house trailer in this case was a
"dwelling-house" within the meaning of that
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term as used in the first section of the arson
act. They interpreted the crime of first degree
arson as an offense against the security of a
person's home and found that the clear intent
of the legislature was to protect the home from
wilful and malicious destruction by fire.
"Dwelling-house" was defined as being a
structure intended or used for human habita-
tion-a "home." The character of such a
structure was deemed generally immaterial if it
was occupied as a dwelling, as it clearly was in
this case. Characterizing a house trailer as a
mobile house, it was noted that in one case a
trailer placed on boxes and jacks and connected
with water and electric lines had been held to
be subject to a building code ordinance. Lower
Merion Twp. v. Gallup, 158 Pa.Super. 572, 46
A.2d 35 (1946). As disclosed in the record the
trailer here had been withdrawn from use as a
vehicle and was being used as a place of habita-
tion, thus making it immaterial that it may
also have been properly denominated as
personal property.
It is submitted that this decision serves as a
caution to state legislators to re-examine their
local arson statutes. Since the number of house
trailers and semi-permanent trailer "camps" is
steadily increasing- throughout the United
States, it is foreseeable that this-problem will
arise again. Therefore, local arson statutes
should be scrutinized in order to ascertain
whether any ambiguity exists as to the status
of house trailers and, if so, to cure the defect
before the possibility of a miscarriage of
justice occurs.
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination Relates Solely to Testimonial
Utterances-In a prosecution for operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated, the trial judge
refused to admit the testimony of a police
officer that the defendant had reftsed to supply
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a sample of his urine for a chemical test. The
plaintiff city appealed arguing that this consti-
tuted prejudical error. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin held that the privilege against self-
incrimination does not extend to evidence
secured from the body of the accused, absent
an exertion of physical force which "shocks the
conscience." Furthermore, testimony of a
police officer relating to the refusal of an ac-
cused to furnish a sample of his blood or urine
for chemical analysis also cannot be properly
excluded on the ground that it is violative of
the privilege. However, under a Wisconsin
statute, Wisc. STAT. c.325, §85.13(4) (1954), a
trial court is vested with the discretion either
to admit or to exclude evidence of a refusal to
submit a specimen of body fluid. The court
construed this statute only in regard to the
narrow issue in this case and expressly declined
to issue a ruling on whether or not the statute
permitted the trial court to exclude the evidence
obtained as a result of a chemical test. City of
Barton v. Covey, 72 N.W.2d 387 (Wisc. 1955).
See also, INBAU, SEr.-INcRumATroN 70
(1950).
Reversible Error to Admit Evidence that
Accused Refused to Submit to Intoxication
Test-The defendant was tried and convicted
of criminal negligence for striking and killing a
pedestrian while driving in a state of intoxica-
tion. At the trial of the case the principal fact
in.issue was the defendant's intoxication. Pur-
portedly for the purpose of establishing that the
defendant had had a "fair examination," the
prosecution introduced over the objection of
cqunsel testimony to the effect that the de-
fendant had refused to allow a doctor to take a
blood specimen. On appeal it was held that
under New York law an accused has a right to
refuse a test for intoxication. Under the cloak
of the privilege against self-incrimination "the
receipt of evidence.., of a defendant's com-
plete silence or refusal to answer" when re-
quested to submit to a test constitutes reversible
error. People v. StraUon, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362
(N.Y.App.Div. 1955).
Refusal of Trial Court to Admit Results of
Lie-Detector Test Performed upon the Ac-
cused Does Not Constitute Error-The de-
fendant was convicted of second degree murder
in the death of his wife; his primary defense
was that the killing was accidental. Prior to the
trial a lie-detector test was performed upon the
accused, evidently by Alex L. Gregory, a
member of the Detroit Police Department and
experienced in the use of the lie-detector. At the
trial defendant's counsel sought to introduce
the results of the test but the trial judge
sustained an objection to their admission.
However, the defense counsel was permitted to
make an offer of proof for the record and he
then qualified as an expert witness Dr. Le-
Moyne Snyder. Dr. Snyder's testimony, in
substance, established that: (1) there is a
definite relationship between wilful lying and
an elevation of blood pressure, fluctuations
and the depth of respiration and variations in
the resistance to electric current; (2) such a
relationship can be accurately recorded by a
lie-detector; (3) about ten percent of the
population, for mental or medical reasons, are
not proper subjects for an accurate recording;
(4) an operator can err in his interpretations;
(5) such evidence is more accurate than many
types of admissible evidence, including that of
eye-witnesses; and, (6) it is successfully used by
many judges in pre-sentence investigations.
Despite this testimony contained in the offer
of proof, the Supreme Court of Michigan held
that the refusal to admit the evidence did not
constitute error. People v. Davis, 72 N.W.2d
269 (Mich. 1955).
In effect the court followed its ruling in
People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503
(1942) where it had held that until such time
as there is a general scientific recognition of
such tests and until it is reasonably certain that
they have achieved a high degree of accuracy,
it is error to admit the results thereof. Quoting
with approval from INBAU AND REID, LiE DE-
ECrION AND CR ILMAL oiTERR oGATION (3d
ed; 1953), the court found that such tests have
not as yet "reached the stature of evidence ad-
missible in a court of law." Expanding upon its
conclusion, the court stated that it did not
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belittle or detract from the role of the lie-
detector in the fields of criminal interrogation
and detection in which the lie-detector has
been of great value. However, because there
still remains a ten to twenty-five percent
chance of error, the validity of the results
hinges to a large degree upon the training and
expertness of the examiner, no commonly ac-
cepted standards for interpretation presently
exist, a significant percentage of the populace
does not present proper subjects for examina-
tion, and such tests would carry a tremendous
weight in the minds of the jury, the court de-
cided against according lie-detector tests "the
dignity of positive evidence."
Determination of Gestation Period in Bas-
tardy Proceedings-Evidence introduced by
the prosecutrix in a prosecution for fornication
and bastardy tended to establish that the last
time that the defendant had had intercourse
with her was 310 days before the birth of the
child. The prosecutrix testified that she had not
had intercourse with anyone subsequent to her
last meeting with the defendant and also that
she had a menstrual period about one month
subsequent to her last intercourse with the de-
fendant. The only positive medical testimony
appearing in the case was to the effect that a
normal gestation period runs for 282 days from
the date of the last menstruation, but that there
can be a leeway of two weeks either way. In
charging the jury the trial judge quoted from a
previous decision by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania in which a medical text had in
turn been quoted. The substance of the charge
was that gestation could vary from 220 to 330
days from the date of the last act of intercourse.
To this charge the defendant excepted. He
subsequently prosecuted an appeal from a
finding of guilty and an order of support, con-
tending that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain the conviction.
The majority of the court held that under
previous decisions it was permissible for the
trial judge to take judicial notice of accepted
medical opinions, which the trial judge had in
effect done in this case. The majority also re-
jected the argument that the charge had to be
based upon the medical evidence appearing in
the record, remarking that the testimony
setting up limits of 268 to 296 days from the
last menstrual period "was obviously a quick
generalization." A concurring opinion turned
primarily on the issue of credibility, stating
that the testimony if believed established the
guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt. The concurring judge was also of the
opinion that even if the trial judge had erred in
his charge to the jury concerning the length of
gestation that this did not constitute pre-
judicial error.
A well-documented dissent argued that the
guilt of the defendant had not been established
beyond a reasonable doubt. Taking the evidence
most favorable to the prosecutrix, the dissent
pointed out that the child had been born 312
days from the last act of intercourse with the
defendant; and that the child had been born
283 days after the last menstrual period, which
had occurred one month after the last act of
intercourse. The dissenting judges did not
argue that it was impossible [they noted that
there was one chance in 3,500,000] for thie de-
fendant to be the father of the child, but
merely that the probability of his being the
father was so remote that it raised a serious
doubt as to his guilt. When this fact was
coupled with what the dissent felt to be a
serious error in the charge to the jury concerning
the period of gestation it was felt that there
should be a new trial to determine whether the
defendant was the father. A close examination
of a number of medical authorities led to the
conclusion that in modern medical history
there are about twelve documented instances
where birth occurred more than 312 days after
intercourse. After establishing that these facts
showed more than a reasonable doubt of guilt
the dissent concluded that to allow the trial
judge to pick one medical authority at random,
charge the jury therefrom and then fail to give
any additional warning that gestation lasting
more than 300 days is unusual and improbable,
is to confuse the jury and to invite injustice.
Commonwealth v. Watts, 116 A.2d 844 (Pa.
Super. 1955).
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Tape-Recorded Conversation Held Admis-
sible in Bribery Case-The defendant, who had
taken bribes in connection with his duties as
chief of detectives investigating a burglary,
appealed from a conviction on four counts of
asking and receiving a bribe to influence his
official acts. Among the errors alleged on appeal
was the assertion that certain tape recorded
evidence had been erroneously admitted. Spe-
cifically, the defendant argued that partial
inaudibility, improper identification, the best
evidence rule, the secret and involuntary man-
ner in which it was secured and prejudicial
obscenity contained thereon, all served to
render the recording inadmissible. After finding
that partial inaudibility does not render the
entire recording inadmissible, the ,court ex-
plored the contention of improper identifica-
tion. This problem arose when it was established
that the recorded conversation had been
"dubbed" from a miniature wire recorder to a
tape, so as not to require the use of earphones.
Since the record showed that this had been done
by a standard method, that two persons had
testified as to the identical nature of the two
recordings, that one of these two had been
present at the "dubbing" and that the voice
had been identified as being that of the de-
fendant, the court found that the tracing
shown was sufficient to identify the exhibit.
In dealing with the argument that the tape
recording was not the best evidence, the court
analogized this recording to a photograph and
the original wire recording to a negative and
stated that the same principles apply equally
well to both. The involuntary nature of the
recording and the possible prejudicial effect of
obscene language were found not to effect ad-
missibility. State v. Lyskoski, 287 P.2d 114
(Wash. 1955).
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